Wresting the Initiative

This monograph examines the conduct of operations of the United States'; Eighth Army under the command of General Matthew B. Ridgway in the Korean War. During the period of Ridgway's command, from late December of 1950 through April of 1951, the Eighth Army stopped an offensive campaign being conducted by Chinese Communist Forces. After completing a successful withdrawal and defense, Ridgway's Army mounted a series of offensive operations to regain lost territory and reestablish a defensive line along the 38th Parallel. Thus, this case study examines the campaign of an operational commander who successfully wrested the initiative back from the enemy and illustrates the significance of the AirLand Battle tenet of "initiative" at the operational level of war. The monograph is divided into four major sections. After an introduction in Section I, Section II discusses the current doctrine concerning the tenet of initiative as described in Field Manual 100-5, Operations. Section III examines the theoretical foundations of the concept of initiative as expressed in the writings of Clausewitz. Section IV describes Ridgway's conduct of withdrawal, defensive and offensive operations in early 1951. The concluding section evaluates Ridgway's operational design using the key concepts found in FM 100-5 -- centers of gravity, lines of operation, and culminating points. In sum, this monograph uses classical theory, current doctrine, and history in evaluating Ridgway's operational design, planning and execution during the Eighth Army's withdrawal, defensive and offensive operations. This case study examines the linkages between the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war. The physical, cybernetic and moral domains of war are employed as a framework for analysis. Several insights emerge from this case study including the significance of: gaining and retaining the initiative in the conduct of both defensive and offensive operations; seeking tactical and operational success,