Conditionality & its management by Bretton Woods Institutions

Thesis (M.A.) from the year 2003 in the subject Economics - Macro-economics, general, grade: 1,0, University of Innsbruck (Sozial- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftstheorie, -politik und -geschichte), language: English, abstract: Inhaltsangabe:Abstract:§In the present master thesis shall be analysed hidden effects ensuing from approaches on Conditionality intended at the Bretton Woods Conference to be used by IMF and World Bank, as well of those that were finally executed by them. The main focus in this research lies on the altering management of that what is interpreted as Conditionality by these institutions, namely a barter of economic policy adaptations against complementary lending. In order to comprehend the accompanying implications behind, this view will be enriched of new aspects: §The first chapter highlights selected analogies to a related concept used widely within positivistic civil law, revealing, next to an even-handed functioning of the basic mechanism, also a concentration of institutional roles that would not be permissible on national level. The second analysis introduces to the historical background of the Bretton Woods Conference and evaluates according proposals concerning Conditionality. In the following there are taken into consideration global political evolvements too that opened the door towards ulterior fields of appliance, of whom development resulted being the most fertile one. This leads directly to the elaboration of the two basic strategies followed by the Bretton Woods Institutions in order to leverage their restricted financial capabilities.§Finally conclusions are drawn about the role that Conditionality plays within the value-creating chain of an international financial institution, whose outputs, like those of IMF and World Bank, are interpreted in terms of global public goods. The missing link between Conditionality and GPGs is bridged through the introduction of the Conditionality-GPG-Profile that allows the obtainment of a respective profile of Conditionality-bound institutional efforts.§Inhaltsverzeichnis:Table of Contents:§AbstractIII§Acronyms and AbbreviationsVII§1.Introduction1§2.The basic concept of Conditionality5§2.1Conditionality as it is seen by the Bretton Woods Institutions5§2.2The Conditional Contract of Italian Civil Law6§2.2.1The implications8§2.2.2Evaluation of Civil Law conditional concept11§2.3Conditionality and the Bretton Woods Conference13§2.3.1Political background of the Bretton Woods Conference14§2.3.2Keynes Conditionality underpinnings18§2.3.2.1Evaluation of Keynes basic ideas on Conditionality25§2.3.3White s Conditionality underpinnings27§2.3.3.1Evaluation of White s basic ideas on Conditionality30§3.Evolution of Conditionality since Bretton Woods33§3.1The first years33§3.2Widening possibilities for the application of Conditionality in the next years35§3.3Development as argument for the application of Conditionality38§4.Relevant aspects of the actual application of Conditionality within collective action44§4.1Starting situation for collective action and Conditionality44§4.2Two basic strategies of IFIs46§4.2.1Conditionality oriented towards crisis management46§4.2.2Conditionality oriented towards prevention48§5.Conditionality and GPGs50§5.1Identifying the role of Conditionality in the value-chain of IFIs50§5.2Evaluation approach of IMF s New Programs Conditionality56§5.2.1Classification of GPGs56§5.2.2Classification of Conditionality57§5.2.3The Conditionality-GPG-Profile58§The following pages contain the instructions that explain how the Conditionality-GPG-Profile works58§5.2.3.1Description of C-GPG-Profile structure58§5.2.3.2Consequences of Structural Conditionality about General government tax and expenditure...